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Abstract—When an airliner and a Remotely Piloted Air System
(RPAS) have conflicting courses that may compromise the min-
imum safety separation between them, how much in advance
should the RPAS start the separation manoeuvre? Which is the
optimal heading change that will guarantee the desired separation
distance with a minimum reaction time? These same questions
can be asked if it is the airliner that performs the separation
manoeuvre. In this paper the time reaction margins for both
aircraft are analysed assuming they are equipped with Automatic
Dependent Surveillance (ADS) systems able to exchange aircraft
intents. Due to their small cruise speeds, RPAS manoeuvres must
be initiated well before the airliner ones. This leads to some safety
buffer in case the RPAS cannot comply with the required change
of trajectory or if it becomes suddenly unresponsive (due to an
internal failure or because a lost-link situation). The paper also
assesses the operational point of view by simplifying the reaction
times and conflict geometries by grouping them in a small set of
cases, regarding the severity of a loss of separation event.
Keywords—Separation conflicts; unmanned systems; airspace
integration
I. INTRODUCTION
The lack of consolidated regulations concerning remotely
piloted air system (RPAS) certification, airworthiness and
operations is still banning their civil use into non-segregated
airspace. The pressure to integrate seamlessly their operations
in civil aviation is increasing day by day and several insti-
tutions and safety agencies all around the globe are devoting
significant efforts to this objective [1], [2], [3], [4]. Most of
the remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) platforms that are likely to
populate our skies in the future present flight performances
(in terms of cruise speeds, bank angles, or climb/descent
rates) significantly poorer than typical commercial airliners.
However, they are expected to operate at very similar altitudes
and therefore, separation and collision avoidance systems,
mechanisms or procedures, well established nowadays in civil
aviation, will have to be reviewed.
Extensive research has been devoted to collision avoidance
algorithms that already take into account the particularities of
RPAS. Most of the works inherit from robotics and control
theory applications, like for instance [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11]. Collision risk assessments for RPAS are also found in
the literature [12], [13] which in turn, will set the basis to
determine the required performances for the sense and avoid
capabilities of the RPAS – one of the major challenges (at tech-
nological but also at regulatory levels[14]. Yet, few researchers
have addressed the separation problem specifically for RPAS.
Some proposals indeed, implement separation minima in their
algorithms (like for example [6]), but they are in general,
focused in very small RPA and typical separation values are
in the order of meters. Yet, if bigger RPA are expected to fly
into non-segregated airspace, larger separation values (such as
5 or 10 NM) will have to be considered[15].
SESAR and NextGen programs propose new paradigms that
rely on accurate design and execution of four-dimensional
trajectories that are expected to transition from radar control to
trajectory-based operations. For example Airborne Separation
Assurance Systems (ASAS) aim to delegate separation tasks
from controllers to pilots or at least, enhance the situational
awareness of the aircraft crew[16]. The accuracy of these
systems, however, must rely on aircraft intent information.
Otherwise, future flight paths can not be deduced with certainty
from only past flight path information, current state vectors or
by extrapolating (even with error free) the information of those
state vectors[17]. Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)
systems, installed on-board the aircraft and transmitting its
position and intentions, will likely be the enablers for future
(self-)separation applications in manned or unmanned aviation.
In a first publication[18], the authors evaluated simple (but
typical) conflict scenarios where heading changes were given
to a RPAS in order to maintain a minimum separation distance
with a much faster aircraft in a conflicting trajectory. As
expected, results showed the importance of the relative speed
between the two aircraft, being backward conflicts (the intruder
chasing the RPA from behind) the most demanding ones. In
[19], [20] a taxonomy for different conflict situations was pro-
posed, along with possible separation assurance manoeuvres
that could be undertaken by the RPAS.
In this paper it is supposed that both the RPAS and airliner
are equipped with ADS systems and once the conflict is
detected, the RPAS will initiate the separation manoeuvre.
According to ADS standard radio frequency radiation patterns,
we compute the earliest time a conflict can be detected for the
RPAS and consequently, its reaction time window is derived.
Within this time window, the RPAS can initiate a heading
change manoeuvre in such a way that the minimum separation
is maintained between both aircraft. Then, an hypothetical
case is considered where the RPAS does not actually execute
the separation manoeuvre (considering, for instance, a loss-
link emergency, a failure of the on-board separation assurance
system or simply that is deemed more appropriate to solve the
conflict by changing the airliner trajectory). Thus a new time
window is computed showing the available margin for faster
airliner to react.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. In
Section II, the RPA-Airliner separation conflict is presented
as a whole, in which any of both aircraft may perform the
separation manoeuvre. It also describes the separation conflict
model identifying the optimal separation heading changes.
Section III explains in depth the proposed RPA separation ma-
noeuvres. Section IV analyses the feasibility of the separation
manoeuvres for the whole range of conflict geometries. Finally,
Section V revisits the results obtained in the previous section
adapting them to an operational perspective.
II. RPA-AIRLINER SEPARATION CONFLICTS AS A WHOLE
Previous research by the authors has already investigated
the way in which an RPA may execute a separation ma-
noeuvre in case such a conflict exits with a much faster
airliner [18], [19], [20]. However, the analysis so far has been
performed under a simplified geometry and assuming that the
RPA was always initiating the required separation reaction.
Results showed some limitations in certain geometries. RPA
typical slow speeds imply that higher separation angles are
required to attain the same levels of separation compared to
a typical conflict between two airliners. Moreover, RPA poor
climb/descend performance also limit separation manoeuvres
in the vertical plane. Speed adjustments show also some
limitations and finally, but equally important, RPAs limited
bank angles imply that the separation manoeuvre cannot be
considered instantaneous and that the resulting separation turns
need to be considered in the geometric models.
This section will revisit all the parameters indicated above
under the light of our new objective; that is, understanding
the RPA-airliner separation conflict as a whole, in which
any of both vehicles may manoeuvre under the supervision
of an air traffic control operator (ATCo). Additionally, the
uncertainty produced by an unresponsive RPA needs also to
be investigated, so that the full picture of the existing safety
margins is understood. The final goal of the overall analysis
is to prevent breaching the desired separation margins, thus
avoiding that a mid-term separation conflict develops by action
or inaction into a collision avoidance issue.
A. Separation Conflict Scenario
Figure 1 depicts the general scenario under analysis in this
paper. Two aircraft, an airliner and a RPAS, have conflicting
courses that may end up by loosing the desired horizontal
separation distance between them (not necessarily ending up
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Fig. 1. Geometry of the conflict and reaction time windows for the UAS
and the airliner.
in a collision). At some point, the aircraft will identify the
potential conflict, thanks to some on-board equipment such as
ADS, a traffic information system (TIS) or simply because the
ATCo will detect it. A first question could be: who should
manoeuvre to avoid the separation conflict? Yet, it is out of
the scope of this paper to assess this question, as it will depend
on multiple factors such as: how is the traffic situation around
both aircraft?, has the airliner somehow more priority over the
RPA? etc.
Taking into account that the RPA will fly slower than the
airliner, it will have to initiate the separation manoeuvre well in
advance. In other words, once the conflict is detected, the RPA
has less time to initiate the manoeuvre, should the minimum
separation distance be respected. In this paper, we will compute
these time windows or reaction margins, as shown in Figure 1,
along with the optimal heading changes that guarantee the
desired level of separation. Besides the conflict geometry, these
margins strongly depend on the speed of both aircraft, but also
on the bank angle capabilities of the manoeuvring aircraft.
Changing the altitude of one of the aircraft is indeed a
possible solution to avoid the conflict. It should be noted,
however, that this manoeuvre could not be effective if executed
by the RPA, due to the extremely poor climbing (or even
descending) performance that most of the RPA might have
at typical mission altitudes (just few hundred feet per minute).
Obviously, the airliner could always be the aircraft to change
the flight level. Nevertheless, in this paper we focus only in
lateral manoeuvres aiming at assessing their limits and safety
time margins.
Figure 2 depicts the basics of the separation conflict scenario
under consideration. A RPA and an airliner are both flying
at a constant speed and altitude and they have conflicting
straight trajectories (future work will need to consider the
implications of any of both aircraft flying close to a turning
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Fig. 2. Geometries for the separation manoeuvres.
point in the flight plan). We define td as the instant of time
when the separation conflict is detected. ADS standards specify
that intruders shall be detected at a constant minimum time,
regardless of the conflict geometry [21]. Thus, typical radiation
patterns for ADS antennae are not omnidirectional, as shown
in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Radiation pattern of an ADS antenna
According to the depicted conflict scenario, at td the airliner
is located at point Pa (td), while the RPA is at Pu (td) and
they are separated a distance d (td). The conflict geometry is
defined by the angle β that can range from 0◦ up to 360◦.
Both aircraft are moving towards the same position (Pc) and
will arrive there at the same time.
In order to avoid this separation conflict, one of them
will change its trajectory, being ∆hopt the heading change
with which the minimum distance between aircraft (dmin) is
maximised. The computation of this optimal heading change
was already presented in [18], [20]. Results showed that if
we take into account the performance dissimilarities in terms
of speed and bank angle, the minimum separation distance
will be greater if the fastest aircraft performs the separation
manoeuvre; that is, the airliner. Yet, it is worth assuming that
in the future, manned commercial flights might have higher
priority than the RPAS when facing conflicting trajectories.
Thus, both cases will be analysed in this paper.
Moreover, if the minimum separation distance between
aircraft is set to a fixed value, as typically occurs in controlled
airspace, we can define the reaction time tr as the time elapsed
between the instant the conflict is detected (td) and the last
time that the minimum separation distance could be maintained
if the reaction manoeuvre is applied.
B. Optimal Separation Angles
We will use a forward conflict (β = 180◦) to exemplify this
scenario (see Figures 4 and 5. In Fig. 4 the conflicting aircraft
are an Airbus A320 and a Boeing 737, having both similar
cruise speeds, while in Fig. 5 the Airbus A320 trajectory is
in conflict with an MQ-9 RPA. For both figures, the plot on
the left shows the results when the slowest aircraft performs
the heading change, while the plot on the right shows the case
when the fastest aircraft manoeuvres. The x-axis represents
∆h, while in the y-axis depicts the minimum distance between
the aircraft. Each line of the plots represents a different Time
to Conflict tc, which is discretised in steps of 1 minute, from
2 to 10 minutes.
As expected, the lower the tc, the lower minimum separation
distance achieved for a given ∆h. Moreover, when aircraft
speeds are dissimilar, clear differences appear depending on
who performs the separation manoeuvre. For example, as seen
in Fig. 5, if the aircraft are situated at tc = 5 minutes from
the conflict point and the reaction manoeuvre is performed
at ∆h = 20◦, the minimum achieved separation distance is
either 14 NM or only 5 NM depending on who performs the
manoeuvre. The reader is referred to [18] for more examples
and a detailed analysis of the different geometries.
III. ENHANCED ANALYSIS FOR THE RPAS SEPARATION
MANOEUVRES
The initial separation analysis performed so far does not
take into account some effects that may have a negative impact
in the execution of the separation manoeuvres: essentially the
RPA bank angle limitations and dynamics. For RPAS operating
at high altitudes these limitations are not negligible. Fig. 6
depicts a more detailed conflict scenario in which bank angle
−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Minimum Separation for: beta = 180º, v = 470 kt, u = 500 kt
M
in
im
um
 S
ep
ar
at
io
n 
[N
M]
Delta Heading [º]
−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Minimum Separation for: beta = 180º, v = 500 kt, u = 470 kt
M
in
im
um
 S
ep
ar
at
io
n 
[N
M]
Delta Heading [º]
t
s
 = 10 min ts = 10 min
t
s
 = 2 min ts = 2 min
Fig. 4. Forward conflict in which (a) the slower B737 performs a separation heading change and (b) the fastest A320 performs the heading change.
Fig. 5. Forward conflict in which (a) a MQ-9 performs a separation heading change and (b) an A320 performs the heading change.
and roll factors are taken into account for backward conflicts
(lateral and oblique/forward conflicts need a similar analysis).
A. Analysis of backward separation manoeuvres
Let us assume an RPA that predicts a separation conflict
with an airliner and determines the optimal heading change
needed to maintain a certain separation distance (such for
example 5NM). The resulting trajectory will be that strictly
complying with this separation minima, i.e. all trajectories
executed later (regardless the heading change) will result into
a loss of separation.
The ability of the RPA to properly intercept the desired
separation trajectory is determined by its turning performance
and by the anticipation used to initiate the manoeuvre, thus
compensating the actual turning limitations. Once the RPA
pilot has committed to execute the separation manoeuvre, the
RPA will initiate its heading change. However, when modelling
the turn behaviour of the RPA it is well accepted to assume a
certain delay in order to model the roll time (the time required
to achieve the turning bank angle). This time mainly depends
on the handling qualities of the aircraft, its speed and to a
lesser extent the altitude. After this initial roll time, the RPA
is assumed to start changing the heading (as a function of the
bank angle and speed).
Multiple turning scenarios exist depending on the instant
in which the RPA initiated its manoeuvre when reacting to a
forward conflict. In Fig. 6, following the trajectory labeled
A, the RPA initiates the manoeuvre with the exact timing
producing a perfect turn that later on intercepts the separation
trajectory at point A′. From then on, the RPA will roll back to
follow a straight trajectory until the conflict is cleared. If the
RPA performs as described, it will never violate the minimum
separation distance.
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Fig. 6. Turn limitation effects for forward/backward separation conflicts.
On the contrary, if the RPA delays its turn until reaching
point B (due to a late decision or due to a bad turning model),
a loss of separation will occur. In this situation the RPA will
turn right until a point in space in which it will roll back to
the left in order to intercept the separation trajectory from the
other side at point B′. During this period of time the RPA
has been flying beyond the theoretical separation trajectory,
although the separation between the RPA and the intruder may
not be breached if the intruder is distant enough.
The main question to respond is to determine if the instant
in which both the RPA and the airliner reach their minimum
separation distance occurs before or after the RPA has been
able to intercept back the theoretical separation trajectory. Our
analysis will limit the number of turning manoeuvres to those
executed just after surpassing the optimal turning point A
until the theoretical turning point T . We discuss in detail the
scenario in which a RQ-4 Global Hawk performs a separation
turn as the impact of the speed on the turn limitations is much
important than for a MQ-9 Reaper (170 kt). In fact, results
demonstrate that this effect is almost negligible for a MQ-9,
but not for a RQ-4.
B. Turn limitations and delays as a function of the intruder
speed
Figures 7, 8 and 9 depict the simulation results when
calculating the minimum separation distance as a function of
the intruder speed and the turn delay for the backward conflict
geometry when the turn limitations of the RPA are taken into
account. A Time to Conflict (tc) of 5 minutes is applied in
each figure. All of them plot, in the x-axis, the intruder speed
(a range from 400 up to 600 kt has been considered) while, in
the y-axis the minimum distance (in NM) is depicted. Each line
represents a different delay, ranging from 0 up to 25 seconds.
The coloured little circles show when the minimum distance
has been achieved: the green ones set it in the first stage
(the RPA is turning while crossing the theoretical separation
trajectory), the yellows in the second (the RPA rolls back to
adjust to the theoretical trajectory)and, finally, the blues in the
third (the RPA is already following that trajectory). Finally,
the red line indicates the achieved separation distance when no
turn limitations or delays are applied; this is, when applying an
instantaneous 90 degree heading change. Figure 7 represents
the case when the speed of the RPA is set to 170 kt. The
time when the minimum separation distance is achieved occurs
after the RPA turn manoeuvre is performed regardless the
considered intruder speed and delays. Hence, we can conclude
that the effect of turn limitations over the achieved separation
distance can be modelled as an instantaneous turn and a
constant offset.
When increasing the speed of the RPA the turn limitations
should not be modelled as a constant, rather the detailed
turning trajectory should be considered. This is because the
minimum separation distance is not achieved after the turn
manoeuvre is completed but during that turn itself. Hence, the
trajectory of the RPA when performing the turn should be
taken into account. This effect is depicted in Figures 8 and
9. Figure 8 represents the case when the speed of the RPA
is set to 250 kt. Several aspects have changed with regard
to Fig. 7. First, the coloured circles now indicate that the
time when the minimum separation distance is achieved occurs
when the turn manoeuvre is being performed. For the lower
range of considered intruder speeds this occurs during the first
turn (green circles). On the other hand, as the intruder speed
increases, this time is postponed to the second one (blue ones).
Finally, in this case the delay is not negligible for the lower
range of intruder speeds. The greater the turn is delayed the
smaller separation distance is achieved.
If the RPA speed is increased, the effects of a limited bank
angle and delay are greater. Figure 9 shows the case when it
is set to 300 kt. Now the delay effects have been extended
to the whole range of considered intruder speeds, being more
important at lower speeds. Note that, in some cases, it is better
to consider the turn limitations rather than considering the
ideal case. This is because an instantaneous 90 degree heading
change is not the optimal manoeuvre for resolving backward
conflict geometries.
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Fig. 7. Minimum separation for backward conflicts (β = 0o) as a function
of intruder speed where α = 15o and v = 170kt.
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Fig. 8. Minimum separation for backward conflicts (β = 0o) as a function
of intruder speed where α = 15o and v = 250kt.
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Fig. 9. Minimum separation for backward conflicts (β = 0o) as a function
of intruder speed where α = 15o and v = 300kt.
C. Turn limitations and delays as a function of the bank angle
Figures 10, 11, and 12, show the simulation results for the
backward conflict geometry. All figures plot, in the x-axis, the
bank angle (from 5◦ up to 30◦) and the minimum separation
distance in the y-axis. Figure 10 depicts the result when the
RPA speed is set to 170 kt. In this case, we can conclude
that the minimum separation is not correlated with the delay,
at least for bank angles greater than 7 degrees. Regarding the
relation between the separation distance and the bank angle, it
can be seen a local minimum of 6.5 NM when the bank angle
is approximately 8 degrees. Nevertheless, the variation of the
minimum distance with the bank angle is small.
Results presented in Fig. 10 are not valid when the RPA
speed is increased. Figure 11 shows the results for the same
simulations but, in this case, the RPA speed is set to 250 kt.
The local minimum depicted in Figure 11 has been displaced
to a greater value of bank angle. Unlike before, the delay time
is correlated with the minimum distance for the lower range of
bank angle values. Moreover, there is a local maximum in the
lower range of bank angle, when it is set to 8 degrees. Hence, in
these conditions it is better to perform the turn manoeuvre with
a small bank angle, around 8 degrees, rather than executing it
with a 30 degree. In addition, the minimum distance will be
achieved even before finishing the first turn since a heading
change of 90 degrees is not necessary to achieve the maximum
separation.
If the RPA speed is increased (Fig. 12)the previously ex-
plained results are extended. The variation of the minimum
distance regarding the delay is more pronounced. Both local
minimum and maximum values are displaced to greater values
of bank angle. For this particular case, the optimal value
of bank angle in order to achieve the maximum separation
distance is approximately 10 degrees. Summing up, when
the speeds of both aircraft are more similar, the separation
manoeuvre should be softer from the bank angle point of view.
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bank angle where u = 500kt and v = 170kt.
IV. FEASIBILITY OF THE SEPARATION MANOEUVRES
Separation conflicts involving an airliner and a RPA may be
resolved by means of changing any of their own trajectories
or flight level. Even though vertical manoeuvring may be
possible and even desirable, altitude changes greatly affect
RPAS performing surveillance operations and even RPAS may
suffer from vertical speed limitations at high altitudes. Given
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these conditions, we will strictly focus on lateral separation
manoeuvres, in which three different situations arise (all of
them are depicted in Fig. 13).
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Fig. 13. Separation conflict resolution: (a) the airliner manoeuvres; (b) the
RPAS manoeuvres; (c) an unresponsive RPAS.
If we assume that a potential loss of separation is detected
at a certain instant of time t = 0, the possible collision will
occur at t = td. In the event that the separation conflict has
been detected by means of ADS-B, td will remain constant
regardless the conflict geometry β (recall Fig. 3). Let be
tloss (β) the instant of time when the required lateral separation
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Fig. 14. Reaction polar charts when the airliner performs the separation manoeuvre (from left to right, dsep = {3, 5, 10}NM).
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Fig. 15. RPA performs the separation manoeuvre for dsep = {3, 5, 10} [NM]. The whole range of β is plotted against the reaction time trRPA .
is transgressed. tloss clearly depends on β and therefore, it
will vary as a function of the conflict geometry. On the other
hand, let be tAL (β), tRPAS (β) the airliner and RPAS reaction
times, respectively. They depend on the conflict geometries too.
Finally, tru (β) represents the remaining time that the airliner
has to perform the separation manoeuvre in the case of an
unresponsive RPAS.
Figure 13 (a) shows the case where the ATCo commands
the airliner to perform the separation manoeuvre. The required
separation will not be transgressed if tAL < tloss for the β of
the conflict geometry. On the other hand, Fig. 13 (b) depicts the
case when the RPAS is commanded to perform the manoeuvre.
The required separation will only be maintained if tRPAS <
tloss for the conditions of the conflict geometry. Finally, Fig. 13
(c) represents the most challenging case: if the ATC controller
has commanded the RPAS to perform the manoeuvre, but the
RPAS keeps unresponsive, how much remaining time does the
airliner have to perform itself the separation manoeuvre before
breaching the required lateral separation? In the worst case,
tru = td − tRPAS − tloss. Hence, if tru < tAL, the required
separation could be maintained.
A. The airliner manoeuvres to maintain separation
Figure 14 shows the reaction polar charts when the airliner is
the one that performs the separation manoeuvre. In the radial
dimension the reaction time trAL has been plotted while, in
the angular one, the conflict angle β has been depicted. The
airliner speed is 500 kt for all the charts, but two different
RPA speeds (vUAV) of 170 and 300 kt have been considered
and represented using dotted and patterned lines, respectively.
Each plot depicts a specific minimum lateral separation, from
left to right dsep = {3, 5, 10}NM.
All three charts are symmetrical about a horizontal axis
crossing the coordinate origin. This is because the manoeu-
vring aircraft turns towards the direction in which the conflict
will be better avoided. However, charts do not show any other
type of symmetry. Hence, trAL will vary depending on β.
Moreover, it can be seen that trAL increases if the minimum
separation requirement does. Furthermore, tr remains almost
constant for a specific vuav, except when β ≈ 0◦ (i.e. a
backward conflict). Here, tr increases significantly. For all
considered cases, trAL remains below the instant of time when
the minimum required lateral separation is transgressed tloss.
Hence, a potential separation conflict could be avoided if the
airliner is the aircraft commanded to manoeuvre.
The chart on the left shows the situation when the minimum
separation distance dsep is set to 3 NM. In this case, tr remains
almost constant regardless β and below the one minute thresh-
old, except when β ≈ 0◦ (backward conflict) and vRPA = 300
kt. Here, trAL is increased up to 1.5 minutes. The chart on the
middle plots the case when dsep is set to 5 NM (the most usual
lateral separation between aircraft in radar-controlled airspace).
Again trAL remains almost constant (trAL ≈ 1 min) for a
wide range of β and for the two represented vRPA values.
Nevertheless, for the backward conflict, trAL is increased up
to 1.75 min when vRPA = 300 kt. Finally, the chart on the
right, shows a conservative lateral separation (dsep = 10 NM),
confirms the trend of trAL to increase with respect to dsep.
In this case, when the RPA is flying at 300 kt, trAL for a
backward conflict is increased up to 3.4 min.
B. The RPA manoeuvres to maintain separation
The lateral separation distance is better achieved if the
airliner performs the separation manoeuvre. However, it might
be the case that, due to the surrounding traffic or by assuming
an hypothetical commercial aircraft priority, the RPA may be
requested to perform the necessary separation manoeuvre.
Figure 15 depicts the reaction charts for the conflict geom-
etry when the RPA performs the separation manoeuvre. Three
charts are plotted, one per each required separation distance.
Note that the evolution of trRPA throughout the three charts is
the same as trRPA ; that is, it increases with dsep. However, the
increasing rate now is much higher, specially when β ≈ 0◦,
almost regardless of vRPA. For values of β 6≈ 0◦, tr ranges
from 1 up to 3 minutes, depending on vRPA. In case of a
required lateral separation of 5 NM, trRPA ≈ 1.5min when
β 6≈ 0◦; thus, the lateral separation can be properly maintained.
Even in the case when β ≈ 0◦, trRPA does not exceed
3 minutes. However, the problem arises when the required
separation is increased up to 10 NM. For most β values the
separation can be well maintained. However, when facing a
backward conflict the lateral separation minima is violated
regardless the considered RPA speeds.
C. An unresponsive RPAS
Another factor that must be taken into account is the fact
that when the RPA is commanded to manoeuvre, all the sudden
it may become unresponsive. Then, the only way to resolve the
separation conflict is to command the airliner to perform the
manoeuvre. In this situation, the worst case occurs when the
RPA tried to perform the heading change only tr minutes prior
to the occurrence of the potential collision.
Figure 16 depicts the resulting charts assuming the three dif-
ferent required lateral separations. The dark lines represent the
remaining time after the RPA suddenly becomes unresponsive
and before the potential collision may occur; this is, td−trRPA .
On the other hand, in light gray, the airliner reaction times have
been overlapped.
When dsep is set to 3 NM, there are no intersections between
the light gray lines and the black ones. Hence, the airliner
has enough time to manoeuvre maintaining the required lateral
separation regardless of the conflict geometry. In the worst
case, when facing a backward conflict, the remaining time is
greater than two minutes. If dsep = 5 NM is required, there
are no intersections as well. However, the remaining reaction
time has been drastically reduced, specially in the backward
conflict region. In that region, the light gray and black lines are
extremely close to each other, hence, the remaining reaction
time is close to 0, hence, a loss of separation may occur.
This situation is caused by two different factors. First,
according to Fig. 15, for a required separation of 10 NM, when
β ≈ 0◦ the lateral separation cannot be maintained if the RPA
performs the heading change. Therefore, td − trRPA will be
negative for these range of β values. Second, for some β 6≈ 0
values, td− trRPA > 0 but td− trRPA − trAL will be negative.
In those cases, the loss of separation will also occur. Thus,
according to Fig. 16 when β ∈ {−30◦, 30◦}, the separation
manoeuvre should never be performed by the RPA.
V. THE OPERATIONAL POINT OF VIEW
The results presented in Fig. 16 revealed the relationship
between the required lateral separation distance, the RPA
and airliner velocities (vUAV , vAL) and the conflict angle β.
However, from an operational point of view, these results must
be simplified to make them useful. This simplification leads to
define similar separation conflict areas. Figure 17 brings out
the general strategy and Tab. I summarises it.
The figure shows the same charts as in Fig. 16 but different
areas have been highlighted as a function of the severity of
a loss of separation scenario. The green areas represent the
geometries where the airline has enough time to react, in case
the RPAS is not manoeuvring. The red areas show the cases
where a loss of separations will always occur, since the airliner
does not have enough time to react once the RPAS has been
detected unresponsive. Finally, a yellow zone is represented
indicating that the reaction time for the airliner is rather small.
Required Low Medium High
Separation Risk Risk Risk
Distance β range β range β range
3 NM [0◦, 360◦] N/A N/A
5 NM [45◦, 315◦] [10
◦, 45◦]
[−10◦, 10◦]
[−45◦,−10◦]
10 NM [90◦, 270◦] [60
◦, 90◦]
[−60◦, 60◦]
[−60◦,−90◦]
TABLE I. β RANGES FOR THE OPERATIONAL RISK ZONES.
As seen in Fig. 17 for a minimum separation distance
of dsep = 3 NM the airliner has enough time to react
regardless the conflict geometry (angle β). As dsep increases,
the remaining time that the airliner has to react in case of
an unresponsive RPAS decreases. This is crucial for backward
conflicts, which for dsep = 5 NM the airliner has almost no
time left to react. We arbitrarily set a yellow warning zone
for β ∈ [10◦, 45◦] and β ∈ [−45◦,−10◦]. In the event of an
extended required lateral separation of dsep = 10 NM the zone
in red is obviously larger, with β values ranging from −60◦
up to 60◦. In this case, the yellow zone has been rounded to
β angles ranging form [60◦, 90◦] and β ∈ [−60◦,−90◦].
Concluding, different risk zones have been identified and
simplified as a function of the results on the remaining reaction
time studied in Section IV in order to make them meaningful
from an operational point of view. These extension and location
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Fig. 16. Airliner performs the separation manoeuvre for an unresponsive RPA for dsep = {3, 5, 10} [NM]. The whole range of β is plotted against the
reaction time tru.
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Fig. 17. Operational charts for the resolution of separation conflicts for dsep = {3, 5, 10} NM respectively. Green areas: airliner can react properly even in
the case of an unresponsive RPAS; yellow: airliner can perform the manoeuvre but has to react quickly; red: a loss of separation situation would arise.
of these risk zones vary as a function on the required lateral
separation distance, being more restrictive when increasing it.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A critical requirement for the integration of RPAS into
non segregated airspace is to achieve safe separation between
all surrounding traffic. This paper has analysed in depth the
behaviour of the lateral separation when an airliner enters in
conflict with a RPA, taking into account the peculiarities and
the performance dissimilarities of both types of aircraft. The
manoeuvring reaction times have been accurately calculated
for the whole range of conflict geometries. Results show that
backward separation conflicts (i.e. when both aircraft fly with
the same heading) are the worst case scenario, specially when
an unresponsive RPA is commanded to perform the heading
change.
Based on this result, the paper has introduced a simplifica-
tion of the reaction times and conflict geometries by grouping
them regarding the probability of a loss of separation event.
Three levels of likelihood have been proposed. The soundness
of the concept will be validated by means of a real-time
simulation environment that combines an ATC and RPAS
detailed operation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is funded by the European Organization for the Safety
of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) under its CARE INO III
programme. The content of the work does not necessarily reflect the
official position of EUROCONTROL on the matter.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Dalamagkidis, K. P. Valavanis, and L. A. Piegl, On integrating
unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system: issues,
challenges, operational restrictions, certification and recommendations,
ser. International series on intelligent systems, control, and automation:
science and engineering, S. G. Tzafestas, Ed. Springer-Verlag, 2009,
vol. 26.
[2] P. Ostwald and W. Hershey, “Helping global hawk fly with the rest of
us,” in ICNS Conference, 2007.
[3] M. Gillian, G. J., and V. Cox, “Integration of unmanned aircraft systems
into the national airspace system. concept of operations v2.0,” American
Society of Testing & Materials, Tech. Rep., Sep 2012.
[4] H. H. Hesselink and D. R. Schmitt, “Uas air traffic insertion starts now,”
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, Tech. Rep., 2011.
[5] S. Graham, W. Chen, J. De Luca, M. Kay, J.and Deschenes, V. Wein-
garten, N.and Raska, and X. Lee, “Multiple intruder autonomous
avoidance flight test,” in Proocedings of the AIAA Infotech@Aerospace
Technical Conference. St. Louis, Missouri (USA): AIAA, Mar 2011,
paper No 2011-1420.
[6] D. Alejo, R. Conde, J. Cobano, and A. Ollero, “Multi-UAV collision
avoidance with separation assurance under uncertainties,” in Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Mechatronics (ICM 2009).
Malaga, Spain: IEEE, April 2009, pp. 1–6.
[7] G. Spence, D. Allerton, R. Baumeister, and R. Estowski, “Real-time
simulation of a distributed conflict resolution algorithm,” in Proceedings
of the 26th Congress of the International Council of the Aeronautical
Sciences (ICAS), Anchorage, Alaska (USA), Sep 2008.
[8] G. Dowek and C. Muoz, “Conflict detection and resolution for 1,2,..,N
aircraft,” in Proceedings of the 7th AIAA aviation technology, integration
and operations conference. AIAA, Sep 2007.
[9] C. Carbone, U. Ciniglio, F. Corraro, and S. Luongo, “A novel 3d
geometric algorithm for aircraft autonomous collision avoidance,” in
Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control.
IEEE, Dec 2006, pp. 13 –15.
[10] S. J. Cho, D. S. Jang, , and M. J. Tahk, “Application of TCAS-II
for unmanned aerial vehicles,” in Proceddings of JSASS-KSASS Joint
Symposium on Aerospace Engineering, Nagoya, Japan, Oct 2005.
[11] S. Han and H. Bang, “Proportional navigation-based optimal collision
avoidance for uavs,” in Proceddings of the 2nd International Conference
on Autonomous Robots and Agents, Dec 2004.
[12] R. E. Weibel and J. R. John Hansman, “Safety considerations for
operation of unmanned aerial vehicles in the national airspace system,”
MIT International Center for Air Transportation, Tech. Rep., Mar 2005.
[13] R. E. Weibel, M. W. M. Edwards, and C. S. Fernandes, “Establishing a
risk-based separation standard for unmanned aircraft self separation,” in
Proceedings of the ninth USA/Europe Air Traffic Management Research
& Development Seminar. Berlin, Germany: Eurocontrol / FAA, June
2011.
[14] X. Prats, L. Delgado, J. Ramrez, P. Royo, and E. Pastor, “Requirements,
issues, and challenges for sense and avoid in unmanned aircraft systems,”
Journal of Aircraft, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 677–687, May-Jun 2012.
[15] ICAO, Procedures for Air Navigation Services. Air Traffic Management,
14th ed., International Civil Aviation Organisation, Montreal (Canada),
2001, doc. 4444.
[16] Eurocontrol, “Review of asas applications studied in europe,”
CARE/ASAS Action. CARE/ASAS Activity 4, Technical report, Feb
2002, available at: http://www.eurocontrol.int/care-asas/gallery/content/
public/docs/act4/care-asas-a4-02-037.pdf.
[17] G. Bartkiewicz, “Enhancement of airborne conflict prediction times
through automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) transmit-
ted trajectory intent information,” in Proceedings of the 20th Conference
on Digital Avionics Systems (DASC), vol. 2. AIAA, oct 2001, pp. 7B1/1
–7B1/11.
[18] M. Prez-Batlle, E. Pastor, and X. Prats, “Evaluation of separation
strategies for unmanned aerial systems,” in Proceedings of the 5th
International Congress on Research in Air Transportation (ICRAT).
Berkeley, California (USA): EUROCONTROL / FAA, May 2012.
[19] M. Prez-Batlle, E. Pastor, P. Royo, X. Prats, and C. Barrado, “A
taxonomy of uas separation maneuvers and their automated execution,”
in ATACCS ’12: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference
on Application and Theory of Automation in Command and Control
Systems,, E. Garcia, C. Johnson, W. V. Ochieng, P. Palanque, F. J.
Saez, M. A. Vilaplana, and M. Winckler, Eds., HALA! SESAR
network. Toulouse, France, France: IRIT Press, May 2012, pp. 1–11.
[Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2325676&coll=
DL&dl=GUIDE&CFID=291851014&CFTOKEN=80853617
[20] E. Pastor, M. Prez-Batlle, P. Royo, R. Cuadrado, C. Barrado, and
X. Prats, “On the design of uas horizontal separation maneuvers,”
in Proceedings of the 2nd SESAR innovation days. Braunschweig
(Germany): SESAR, Nov 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.
sesarinnovationdays.eu/2012/papers
[21] I. A. AERONAUTICAL RADIO, “Arinc specification 424-15,” Tech.
Rep., February 2000.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Marc Perez-Batlle is an Aeronautical Engineer from the Technical University
of Catalonia (Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya, UPC). He earned this
degree on 2008. He also holds a degree in Telecommunications Engineering
from the UPC. He earned this degree on 2012. He has been working with
UPC since 2008 and, currently, he is an assistant professor at the School of
Telecommunications and Aerospace Engineering of Castelldefels (EETAC).
Enric Pastor is a Computer Science Engineer from the Technical University of
Catalonia (Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya, UPC). He received his Ph.D
in Computer Architecture from the same university. He has been working with
UPC since 1992 and currently, he is an associate professor at the School of
Telecommunications and Aerospace Engineering of Castelldefels (EETAC).
Xavier Prats is an Aeronautical Engineer from the National School for Civil
Aviation. He holds a degree in Telecommunications Engineering from the
Technical University of Catalonia (Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya, UPC).
He earned both degrees in 2001. He received his Ph.D in Aerospace Science
and Technology from UPC in 2010. He is currently an assistant professor at
the School of Telecommunications and Aerospace Engineering of Castelldefels
(EETAC).
Pablo Royo is a Telecommunications Engineer from the Technical University
of Catalonia (Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya, UPC). He also holds
a Ph.D. in Computer Architecture from the same university. He has been
working with UPC since 2009 and currently, he is a lecturer at the School of
Telecommunications and Aerospace Engineering of Castelldefels (EETAC).
Raul Cuadrado is a Telecommunications Engineer from the Technical
University of Catalonia (Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya, UPC). He has
been working with UPC since 2006 and currently, he is an assistant professor at
the School of Telecommunications and Aerospace Engineering of Castelldefels
(EETAC).
